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We study the contraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) ows in the United States during
the recent nancial crisis and show their unusual non-resiliency, which depends in part on the
global nature of the economic recession, but also on the increases in the cost of nancing FDI
in the economies in which the ows originate. To formally study the eects of external nancial
conditions on FDI in the United States, we exploit the three dimensions of a panel of U.S. inward
FDI ows organized by recipient U.S. industries, source countries, and years for the recorded
ows. Changes in the cost of nance in the source countries have little or no eect on total inward
ows (the sum of equity, debt, and reinvested earnings) over the 2006-2010 period. However,
U.S. industries characterized by more nancial vulnerability experience statistically signicant
variations in the debt and equity components of inward FDI ows in response to the changes in
the cost of capital that occurred in the source countries during the crisis.
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This article documents the contraction of foreign direct investment ows into the United
States at the peak of the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis and describes the relationship
between disaggregated FDI inows and the cost of nance in the source economies. To study
the eects of external nance on FDI in the United States, we analyze a three-dimensional
panel of annual inward FDI ows, organized by U.S. recipient industries, source countries,
and years for the recorded ows. We use data between 2006 and 2010 released by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) at the end of August 2011. The BEA reports FDI ows by
industry and breaks them into three components: equity, debt, and reinvested earnings. We
exploit the cross-industry variation in external nance vulnerability and the cross-country
variation in the cost of capital to estimate the eects of the cost of capital on FDI inows.
We nd little or no eect of the cost of nance in source countries on total U.S. inward
ows. However, between 2008 and 2009, the U.S. industries characterized by a higher degree
of nancial vulnerability experienced statistically signicant shifts in the debt and equity
components of inward FDI ows, following the variations in the cost of capital that occurred
in the source countries. Because we focus on a specic type of capital ows and a specic
economy, our empirical investigation is less comprehensive than other studies in the cross-
country dimension of capital ows. However, we have the advantage of detailed information
and data on bilateral ows between major U.S. industries and a wide range of countries that
is normally not available in studies on international capital ows.
The contraction of FDI ows into the United States that we observe in early 2009 appears
unusual relative to other countries that previously experienced nancial crises. In other
instances, inward FDI tended to remain stable or even increased (Levchenko and Mauro,
2007). Such a lack of resiliency depends, in part, on the increases in the cost of funding FDI
ows in the economies in which the ows originate, another unusual occurrence relative to
other recent experiences.
It has been established that the crisis occurred at the same time for a large cross section
of nancially integrated countries either because of common shocks or because of interna-
1tional contagion (Imbs, 2010; Rose and Spiegel, 2010). Unlike the global trade collapse,
capital ows contracted too but with heterogeneous patterns along various dimensions. The
contraction was particularly sharp for banking ows in advanced economies after September
2008. Research by Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) for a wide set of countries and by Tille
(2011, this issue) for Asian countries identies the stylized facts and main drivers of the
retrenchment in international capital ows during the recent crisis. Such a retrenchment
was especially dramatic in the wake of the Lehman Brothers failure. Banking ows were the
hardest hit due to their sensitivity to risk perceptions. Across regions, emerging economies
experienced a shorter-lived retrenchment than developed economies. Countries reliant on
bank ows were the hardest hit, in addition to those with weak domestic macroeconomic
conditions. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) show that global banks played a signicant role
in the transmission of the 2007-2009 crisis to emerging market economies. They show that
the loan supply in emerging markets was signicantly aected through a contraction in di-
rect cross-border lending from foreign banks, in local lending by foreign banks aliates in
emerging markets, and in the loan supply by domestic banks resulting from the decline in
interbank lending. Similarly, Duwel, Frey, and Lipponer (2011) nd that the German parent
bank lending adjustment is based almost exclusively on bank-specic factors and that rising
risk aversion among banks curbed cross-border lending during the crisis, especially after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers.
The papers whose spirit is perhaps more related to our work are by Klein, Peek, and
Rosengren (2002) and Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer (2009). Klein, Peek, and
Rosengren (2002) explain the continuing decline in Japanese FDI ows to the United States
during the 1990s with reduced access to credit by Japanese rms. The authors use a unique
dataset that links individual Japanese rms engaged in FDI to their main banks. Using both
bank-level and rm-level data, they nd that nancial diculties at banks were economically
and statistically important for explaining the reduction in the number of FDI projects by
Japanese rms into the United States, even after controlling for the eects of uctuations in
the exchange rate and stock market prices. This article provides strong empirical evidence
in favor of the fact that dierences across rms in their degree of access to credit can be
2an important determinant of FDI. Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer (2009) model
how nancial factors aect FDI decisions when rms exhibit heterogenous productivity lev-
els. Their microeconomic evidence suggests that nancial factors constrain rms' foreign
investment decisions, particularly in the case of large rms. Financial constraints at the
parent level matter for the decision to engage in multinational production but less so for the
magnitude of foreign sales.1
This work is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the data and empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Many international transactions involving nancial instruments { for example, bank loans,
government securities, bonds, and equity { are channeled through markets with numerous
buyers and sellers, standardized contracts, and publicly available prices. The market struc-
tures often approximate perfect competition. FDI, however, is not observed in nancial
markets. Rather, it is the result of nancial and industrial decisions, internal to a particu-
lar rm, that may have real implications potentially unrelated to purely nancial variables.
Outward FDI ows are registered as being generated by rms incorporated in the report-
ing country, whereas inward direct investment ows represent the activity of foreign rms
based in the host economy. For the United States, these ows are categorized by the BEA
as United States Direct Investment Abroad (USDIA) and Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States (FDIUS), respectively.2
Many national statistical agencies report total inward and outward ows. Total ows in
a specic period, however, are often reported as the sum of four components: (1) equity
investment; (2) intercompany debt investment; (3) reinvested earnings; and (4) valuation
adjustments. These components are reported for U.S. inbound and outbound ows, whereas
1The present article is also related to a strand of economic literature that studies the behavior of disaggregated
capital ows during crisis and non-crisis periods. See Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and Stein (2007); Levchenko and Mauro
(2007); Smith and Valderrama (2009); and Contessi, De Pace, and Francis (2010). A common nding of these papers
is that capital ows from developed economies to emerging market economies are more volatile than ows entering
developed economies.
2USDIA data can be negative when repatriation of foreign investment is larger than new investment.
3they are generally not reported by the majority of other countries. We describe these four
components in the Appendix.
We use quarterly annual data on FDI from the BEA.3 The pre-crisis benchmark years are
2006 and 2007. We study the evolution of pairwise ows during the latest nancial crisis and
the subsequent recovery. Table 1 shows the shares of total inward (and outward) ows for
each country, and their cumulative shares, over the 2006-2007 period. Inward FDI ows are
more concentrated than outward ows: Only 13 countries contribute to more than 90% of
U.S. inward FDI, while about 23 countries are the destinations of about 90% of U.S. outward
FDI ows. Most inward FDI ows come from advanced countries and a large part of outward
ows go to advanced economies. Analyzing capital ow data is usually dicult as the data
for many countries are fragmented and not always available. In our empirical investigation we
consider a list of 33 countries (in addition to the United States) with relatively consistent and
complete time series.4 We exclude the tax havens, but we keep the Netherlands, a popular
host of multinationals' headquarters in part for tax reasons.5 In the same table we report
the stock of inward and outward ows for each country as of 2006.
The BEA reports quarterly FDI ows for each industry at the 2- and 3-digit North Amer-
ican Industry Classication System (NAICS) level (see Kort, 2001, Table 2). We use the
same level of industry disaggregation in our empirical investigation.6 We reconstruct four
panels of data using the BEA quarterly U.S. FDI ows as reported in the Balance of Pay-
ments (International Transactions). We have inward ows (ows from abroad into the U.S.,
FDIUS), and outward ows (U.S. FDI abroad, USDIA).7 The quarterly data can be broken
3http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
4Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
5Flows to and from these territories and countries may end up as indirect investment in third countries. In some
countries, the round tripping of FDI also creates a signicant mismeasurement of capital ows. A notable case is
inward FDI in the People's Republic of China, which represents the return of Chinese capital taken abroad to escape
foreign exchange controls.
6Other Industries, code 55-99, are excluded from the analysis.
7USDIA (FDIUS) is ownership by a U.S. (foreign) investor of at least 10% of a foreign (U.S.) business. See \Foreign
Direct Investment in the U.S.: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data" (http://www.bea.gov/
international/di1fdibal.htm) and \U.S. Direct Investment abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment
Position Data" (http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm).
4down only by country or industry, but not by country and industry at the same time. Annual
data from the same source can, instead, be disaggregated by individual components. The
quarterly data (available for the period 1994:Q1-2011:Q1) are used for descriptive purposes in
the rst three gures, while the annual data are considered for estimation in the econometric
exercise described in a later section. The four quarterly series are (1) inFDIiq; (2) outFDIiq;
(3) inFDIkq; and (4) outFDIkq. The prexes in and out in the mnemonics identify inward
and outward ows, q identies the quarter, i identies the country, and k identies the in-
dustry. The annual BEA data on the disaggregated capital ows (sample is 2006-2010) are
identied by similar mnemonics. Therefore, we have a total of 8 additional variables mea-
suring total FDI and its components: (5) inFDItotikt; (6) outFDItotikt; (7) inFDIequiikt;
(8) outFDIequiikt; (9) inFDIdebtikt; (10) outFDIdebtikt; (11) inFDIrearnikt; and (12)
outFDIrearnikt. The sux tot identies total ows without current-cost adjustment; equi
identies the equity component; debt identies the intercompany debt component; and rearn
identies reinvested earnings. This time, t denotes the years.8
Several caveats apply to these data. The most relevant is that balance of payments
transactions (and associated positions) between parents and aliates are recorded against
the country of the foreign aliate with which the U.S. parent had a direct transaction, even
if the transaction may reect indirect claims on liabilities to or income from indirectly held
aliates in third countries. For example, the Bahamas is recorded as one of the top 10
beneciaries of USDIA in 2006, but a large part of this investment is redirected toward other
countries.9 A second shortcoming is that, whereas, prior to 2006, income is presented net of
U.S. and foreign withholding taxes, after 2006, income is presented gross of U.S. and foreign
withholding taxes.
Figures 1 through 4 describe the evolution of FDI ows using the quarterly dataset. FDI
8Some observations in the dataset on capital ows are missing. Data may not be shown for several reasons: (1) The
missing observation appears on another line in the table from which the data are collected, (2) the missing observation
is not shown in the table from which the data are collected but may be available in other detailed country- or industry-
level tables or in other BEA published tables on direct investment, (3) the missing observation is not available, does
not apply, or is not dened. All the entries indicating a nonzero value between -500,000 and +500,000 dollars, rms
with fewer than 50 employees, or indicating that the data in the cell have been suppressed to avoid disclosure of data
of individual companies are converted to zero.
9Unfortunately, the BEA provides stock (position) data but not the ows by country of ultimate beneciary. We
are thus forced to exclude a few countries from our analysis, a decision that may aect our estimates.
5inows to the U.S. substantially drop at the beginning of 2009 (Figure 1). This drop also
occurs in the rest of the developed world, but it looks much more pronounced in the United
States. Figure 2 shows a decline (in 2009:Q1, but also in 2007:Q4) in the U.S. inward FDI
measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Outward FDI only drops at
the beginning of 2009. The same pattern can be seen in Figure 3, where U.S. FDI ows in
2006 are normalized to 100. In Figure 4, the evolution of U.S. FDI inows and outows is
disaggregated by type of ows and reported for all industries and the manufacturing sector
only. With the exception of outows in all industries, the decline in the size of the ows
during the latest nancial crisis is immediately apparent.10
In the empirical investigation that follows, we analyze some of the determinants of inward
FDI and the variations in total and disaggregated ows during the 2007-2009 nancial crisis.
In the next subsections we provide a description of the variables, collected at the country
and/or industry level, which we use in the estimation procedures.
2.1 Industry Characteristics
We compute measures of access to nance for 17 manufacturing and service industries as in
the BEA-FDI Statistcs.11 We use Compustat data for the 1999-2007 period and the BEA-
FDI industry breakdown to compute three measures of external nancial vulnerability and
two measures of factor intensity for each industry.
Measures of External Financial Vulnerability. Empirical research exploiting
cross-industry variation in nancial dependence primarily uses three measures of nancial
vulnerability, which we recalculate for each industry using rm-level data from Compustat
North America. A limitation of these data is that they are collected only for publicly traded
rms. As customary in the literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), we use the fraction of total
capital expenditure not nanced by internal cash ows from operations, a variable that mea-
10Such a decline may have been caused by the large average appreciation of the foreign exchange value of the U.S.
dollar against the currencies of a broad group of major countries between 2008 and 2009.
11The 17 industries and their corresponding BEA codes are: Mining (21), Utilities (22), Food (311), Chemicals
(325), Primary and fabricated metals (331-332), Machinery (333), Computer and electronic products (334), Electrical
equipment, appliances, and components (335), Transportation equipment (336), Other manufacturing (312-324, 326-
327, 337-339), Wholesale trade (42), Retail trade (44-45), Information (51), Depository institutions (5221), Finance
and insurance (52, excluding 5221), Professional, scientic, and technical services (54), Other industries (55-99).
6sures rms' requirements for outside capital. We call this measure EXTERNALFINANCE
(i.e. external nance dependence). We measure access to buyer-supplier trade credit using
the ratio of the change in accounts payable to the change in total assets. This measure, which
we call TRADECREDIT, reects how much credit rms receive in lieu of having to make
upfront or spot payments (see Fisman and Love, 2003). Finally, we construct a measure
of asset tangibility similar to Claessens and Laeven (2003), as the one minus the share of
net plant, property and equipment in total book-value assets. This measure, which we call
TANGIBILITY , reects rms' ability to pledge collateral in securing external nance.12
Each measure of nancial vulnerability is calculated at the rm level as the average value
over the 1999-2005 period. We use the median value across rms in each NAICS industry as
a vulnerability measure for the industry.
Although the time period that we analyze and the industry classication that we use
are dierent from those of Chor and Manova (2012), some of the industries overlap. For
these industries the correlations between our measures of nancial vulnerability and Chor
and Manova's range between 0.74 and 0.98. The three industries for which external nance
dependence is particularly large are computer and electronic products, chemicals, and de-
pository institutions. The three industries with the lowest external nance dependence are:
food, other manufacturing, and machinery. The industries that rely more on trade credit
are wholesale trade; retail trade; and electrical equipment, appliances, and components. The
three industries that have more intangible assets are nance and insurance; information; and
professional, scientic, and technical services. Our measures rank industries similarly to the
existing literature.
Factor Intensity Measures. Similar to Chor and Manova (2012), we compute measures
of industry factor intensities, log (k=lk) (physical capital intensity) and log (hk=lk) (skill
intensity). These variables are available from the NBER-CES database for manufacturing
industries and Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) 4-digit industries.13 We use less dis-
12Industries with more hard assets can usually oer greater collateral to secure loans, and therefore should be less
sensitive to adverse credit conditions. TANGIBILITY , which in our work increases as the share of hard assets
declines, can be seen as a direct proxy for nancial vulnerability.
13The NBER-CES database is a joint eort between the National Bureau of Economic Research and the U.S. Census
Bureau's Center for Economic Studies.
7aggregated data at the NAICS 2-digit level. These measures are not readily available for a
nonnegligible number of service industries. Physical capital intensity is the natural logarithm
of the ratio between real capital stock and total employment. Skill intensity is the logarithm
of the ratio of nonproduction workers to total employment. We discard the option of using
Compustat data for k=lk, as Leonardi (2007) shows huge intra-industry dispersion for this
measure. Instead we use industry-level BEA data.14 We consider Current-Cost Net Stock
of Private Fixed Assets by Industry (Table 3.1ES) and the Chain-Type Quantity Indexes
for Investment in Private Fixed Assets by Industry as an industry-specic deator (National
Income Product Accounts, NIPA, Table 3.8ES) to calculate k. Moreover, we use a measure
of Full-Time Equivalent Employees by Industry (Table 6.5D). The NBER-CES database al-
lows the derivation of the skill-ratio hk=lk as the ratio between nonproduction workers and
total workers. Here we use Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on employees on nonfarm
payrolls by industry and selected industry detail (Table B-1) and data on employment of
production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm payrolls by industry sector
(Table B-6).15 Annual measures are computed using seasonally adjusted data averaged over
12 months.
2.2 Country-Level Variables and Other Data
Cost of Financing. Chor and Manova (2012) use interbank rates from the Thompson
dataset. We opt for two interest rates from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) statistical database: an immediate rate (Im Rate) and a short-
term rate for each country and year in the sample. Immediate rates are generally overnight
interbank rates or rates corresponding to very short-term transactions when interbank rates
are not available. Short-term rates are interbank rates on loans with a maturity between
1 and 3 months. When interbank rates are not available for these maturities, the OECD
database reports yields on the country's treasury bills.16
14http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/SelectTable.asp.
15Data Retrieval: Employment, Hours, and Earnings (CES): Table B-1 (http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/
cesbtab1.htm) and Table B-6 (http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtab6.htm).
16See OECD statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx).
8Country-Level Measures of Factor Abundance. We compute the natural logarithm
of the ratio between a measure of highly skilled labor endowment (H) and total labor force
(L), where H=L = exp((s)), s is the average years of schooling in the population over 25
years of age taken from the Barro-Lee dataset (Barro and Jong-Wha, 2011), and () is a
piecewise linear function with a slope of 0.13 for s < 4, 0.10 for 4 < s < 8, and 0.07 for s > 8
(see Chor and Manova, 2012). The log of the capital-to-labor ratio is from Barseghyan and
DiCecio (2011). Both measures are computed as averages over the 1999-2005 period.
Nominal Exchange Rates, Industrial Production Index. Both annual series are
obtained from the International Financial Statistics dataset of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
GDP. Initial conditions for real GDP and real GDP per capita (constant purchasing power
parity dollars at 2005 prices) are calculated as averages over the 1999-2005 period. Data are
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
U.S. Retail Sales. We collect annual data on total retail sales for the 1999-2009 period
from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Total Commercial and Industrial Loans. Data for commercial and industrial loans
at all commercial banks over 1999-2010 (annual data) are collected from the H.8 release
(Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the U.S.) of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
3 Empirical Strategy
We investigate whether credit conditions can explain the evolution of U.S. inward FDI. The
economic concept is that countries with higher nancing costs are likely to invest relatively
less in those U.S. sectors that are more heavily dependent on external nance. We exploit
the cross-industry and cross-country variation in our annual dataset to isolate the eect of
credit conditions on U.S. inward FDI from the other potential determinants.
As in Chor and Manova (2012), we consider the three measures of nancial vulnerability
described above. FDI series occasionally exhibit negative values or zero entries. In some cases,
9negative values may be due to either underreporting or large disinvestment. The latter is
often caused by repatriation of previous investment. In a linear regression model framework,
using the logarithm of capital ows to reduce the weight of observations with particularly
large values is thus not always a viable solution. A semi-logarithmic transformation would
deal with the zero entries but would not solve the issue of negative observations. Following
Levy-Yeyati, Panizza, and Stein (2007), we transform the inward FDI data as
inFDI

ikt = sign(inFDIikt)  log(1 + jinFDIiktj)
and then estimate the model that follows using a measure of nancial vulnerability and a
type of inward capital ow (total inward FDI, inward equity FDI, and inward debt FDI in
industry k from country i) at a time. For example, we estimate
inFDItot

ikt = 1 (Im Rateit  EXTERNALFINANCEk)
+ 2 (Im Rateit  Crisis  EXTERNALFINANCEk)
+ Dit + Dkt + Dik + ikt;
where Crisis is a dummy variable for the nancial crisis, which is equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009;
and Dit, Dkt, and Dik are, respectively, country-year, industry-year, and country-industry
xed eects. As robustness checks, we consider alternative versions of the model above in
which we exclude some of the xed eects and/or include factor endowment controls, initial
size and income controls, industrial production index controls, and/or exchange rate controls.
In some instances, the crisis dummy in the interaction term of the equation is replaced by
U.S. retail sales, U.S. commercial and industrial loans, or both. In a few cases, we exclude
all measures of nancial vulnerability from the model specication. See the Results section
and the notes to the tables with the regression outputs for further details.
The coecients 1 and 2 are of main interest. 1 describes the eect of the uctuations
in countries' costs of capital on the sectoral composition of inward FDI. The expectation is
10that inward FDI ows to nancially dependent domestic sectors are relatively smaller when
they come from countries that experience higher interbank rates. 2 describes the variation
in this eect during the two years of the nancial crisis. The wide set of xed eects in the
model specication allows the identication of 1 and 2 from (1) the dispersion in nancial
dependence across industries within a given country-year pair, (2) the variation in the cost of
credit across source countries in a given industry-year pair, and (3) the variation in the cost of
nance over time within a given country-industry pair. Such an extensive set of xed eects
potentially mitigates problems of omitted-variable bias and allows us to isolate a plausibly
causal eect of credit conditions on FDI ows during the nancial crisis. Nevertheless, in
the next section we describe alternative model specications with additional controls as a
robustness check for our results.
4 Results
When we study the properties of the equity component of inward FDI (inFDIeq), the varia-
tions in the association between the ows and the measures of cost of capital during the peak
of the nancial crisis (2008 and 2009) are almost always statistically signicant. In Table
2 we show that, during the crisis, countries with higher immediate rates tend to provide
relatively higher FDI equity inows to U.S. sectors with a greater requirement for external
nance with respect to the non-crisis periods in the sample. Furthermore, countries with
higher immediate rates tend to provide relatively lower FDI equity inows to U.S. industries
with a greater intensity in intangible assets with respect to the non-crisis periods. These
variations are signicant and of the same sign when we replace the immediate rate with the
short-term rate in the model specications (Table 4). We also nd evidence that, during
the nancial distress, source countries with higher short-term rates tend to provide relatively
lower FDI equity inows to the U.S. industries with a greater degree of access to trade credit.
The variations are signicant, although with inverted signs, when we use Im Spread, the
dierence between the immediate rate and the short-term rate, as a cost of capital measure
(see Table 3).
11In Table 5 the intuition is similar. This time, the crisis measure is not a simple dummy
variable, but two continuous variables: U.S. retail sales and U.S. loans. We estimate a
signicantly negative relationship between immediate rates in the source countries and the
FDI equity inows to U.S. sectors with a greater requirement for external nance. The
magnitude of this association signicantly drops in absolute terms as U.S. loans increase.
U.S. loans decrease during the crisis; therefore, the negative association between FDI equity
inows and immediate rates becomes more pronounced in those two years. Furthermore, we
detect a signicantly positive association between immediate rates in the source countries
and the FDI equity inows to U.S. industries with a greater degree of access to trade credit.
This association becomes signicantly weaker as U.S. loans increase. U.S. loans contract
during the crisis and therefore such a positive association becomes even more pronounced
in the 2008-2009 period. In Table 6, we report a signicantly negative link between the
immediate rates in the source countries and U.S. FDI equity inows, which does not change
signicantly during the nancial crisis.
With inward debt ows (inFDIdebt), the variations in the relationship between such ows
and the measures of cost of capital during the nancial crisis are often statistically signicant.
We nd statistically signicant variations when we use external nance dependence as a
measure of nancial vulnerability. According to the results in Tables 7, 9, and 11, during
the crisis, countries with higher immediate and short-term rates tend to provide relatively
lower FDI debt inows to U.S. industries with a greater requirement for external nance. In
2008 and 2009, countries with higher spreads provide on average relatively higher FDI debt
inows to U.S. sectors with a greater requirement for external nance (Table 8). Table 10
shows that immediate rates and U.S. FDI debt inows are negatively associated for given
requirements for external nance. This negative association signicantly declines in absolute
value (so it shrinks to zero) as U.S. retail sales increase. Given that U.S. retail sales decrease
during the crisis, such a negative association becomes even more pronounced in that period
of time.
Eects and variations are generally not statistically signicant, and therefore results are
unreported, in the case of aggregate FDI ows. However, we nd a signicantly negative
12relationship between total ows and immediate rates. This relationship, which does not seem
to be robust to the inclusion of nancial vulnerability measures in the model specication,
tends to remain stable in 2008 and 2009.
5 Conclusions
In this article we document the contraction of inward FDI ows in the U.S. at the beginning of
2009. Such a decline is unusual relative to the other countries that experienced nancial crises
in the past. In the other crises, FDI generally appears resilient to the economic conditions
of the host economy, in the sense that it tends to remain stable or even increase during
downturns. The lack of resiliency in the United States might depend on push factors and on
the global nature of the economic recession, which inuenced the cost of funding FDI ows
in the economies where these ows originate.
To study the specic eects of nancial vulnerability on FDI, we use a three-dimensional
annual panel of U.S. inward FDI ows organized by recipient U.S. industries, source countries,
and years for the recorded ows. Variations in the cost of nance in the source countries have
little or no eect on the total FDI inows. However, we nd evidence that the industries
in the Unites States that are more nancially vulnerable experienced signicant shifts in
FDI equity and debt inows during the latest nancial crisis, following the changes in the
cost of capital that occurred in the source economies. Our results suggest that studying the
properties of the individual components of FDI is more desirable than using total ows if the
goal is to better understand the evolution of international capital ows over time and their
determinants.
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15Appendix
U.S. FDI Breakdown by Components
The BEA statistics break down U.S. FDI ows into four components, which we describe in
the case of outbound ows. Symmetric arguments apply to the inbound ows.
Equity. The equity of U.S. parent rms in incorporated foreign aliates consists of the U.S.
parents' holdings of capital stock in, and other capital contributions to, their aliates. Capi-
tal stock consists of all stock of aliates, whether common or preferred, voting or nonvoting.
Other capital contributions by U.S. parents consist of (1) capital, invested or contributed,
that is not included in capital stock (such as the amounts paid for stock in excess of its
par or stated value) and (2) capitalizations of intercompany accounts (conversions of debt to
equity) that do not result in the issuance of capital stock.
Intercompany Debt. Intercompany debt ows consist of the change in the U.S. parents'
net intercompany debt due from their foreign aliates during a certain period. The quarterly
change is derived by subtracting the net outstanding intercompany debt balance at the end of
the previous quarter from the net outstanding balance at the end of the current quarter. The
net balance at the end of a quarter (or year) is calculated as the U.S. parents' receivables less
U.S. parents' payables. When a U.S. parent lends funds to its foreign aliate, the balance
of the parent's receivables (amounts due) from the aliate increases; subsequently, when
the aliate repays the principal owed to its U.S. parent, the balance of the U.S. parent's
receivables from the aliate is reduced. Similarly, when a U.S. parent borrows funds from
its foreign aliate, the balance of the U.S. parent's payables (amounts owed) to the aliate
increases; subsequently, when the U.S. parent repays the principal owed to its aliate, the
balance of the U.S. parent's payables to the aliate is reduced.
Reinvested Earnings. Reinvested earnings of foreign aliates are calculated as total
earnings less distributed earnings. Earnings are the shares of U.S. parents in the net income
of their foreign aliates after provision for foreign income taxes. Earnings are from the books
of the foreign aliate. A U.S. parent's share in net income is based on its directly held equity
16interest in the foreign aliate. Reinvested earnings are shown as a separate component of
direct investment nancial ows in recognition of the fact that the earnings of an aliate
are income to the U.S. parent, regardless of whether they are reinvested or remitted to the
parent. However, reinvested earnings are not actually transferred to the U.S. parent but
increase the parent's investment in its aliate.
Valuation Adjustments. They account for changes in the value of nancial assets.























































































































Note: Inward FDI for the United States, OECD countries, the World, and the European Union. The rst observation for
each geographic aggregate is the average of its quarterly ows in 2006-2007 normalized to 100. Source: OECD Directorate for
Financial and Enterprise Aairs, Investment Division.
18Figure 2: U.S. FDI abroad and foreign FDI in the United States as a share of U.S. GDP (1994:Q1-
2011:Q1)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Quarterly U.S. inward and outward FDI ows between 1994:Q1 and 2011:Q1. Flows are reported as percentages of
quarterly GDP. The gray areas represent the nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Source: Authors' calculations based on BEA data.






























































































































































































































































Note: Quarterly inward and outward FDI for the United States normalized to the pre-crisis level. The average of the quarterly
ows in 2006-2007 is set equal to 100. Source: Authors' calculations based on BEA data.














































































Note: Annual inward and outward FDI for the United States normalized to the pre-crisis level. The average of the quarterly
ows in 2006-2007 is set equal to 100. The two graphs on the left report data for all industries, the two graphs on the right
report data for only manufacturing industries. The two top graphs report outows, the two bottom graphs report inows. Total






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 2: Estimation Results for the Equity Component of Inward FDI (1)
Dependent Variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIequi
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3)
Im Rate  Fin Vuln -0.0117 -0.347 0.186
(0.0599) (0.448) (0.127)
Crisis  Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.0259** -0.163 -0.0873*
(0.0112) (0.112) (0.0486)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y
Observations 1,554 1,554 1,554
R
2 0.528 0.529 0.529
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Bold gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. All specications include country-industry, country-year, and industry-year
xed eects. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All specications also include factor endowment
controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l)and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)) and country size and income controls (Crisis 
Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
23Table 3: Estimation Results for the Equity Component of Inward FDI (2)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIequi
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cost of Capital Measure: Im Spread = Im Rate - Short-Term Rate
Im Spread  Fin Vuln 0.00446 0.0174 -0.248 -0.430** 0.0406 -0.0477
(0.0232) (0.0200) (0.195) (0.169) (0.0766) (0.0831)
Crisis  Im Spread  Fin Vuln -0.00307* -0.00553*** 0.0422*** 0.0478** -0.0128 0.0137*
(0.00172) (0.00170) (0.0136) (0.0183) (0.00908) (0.00661)
Factor Endowments Controls N Y N Y N Y
Initial Size and Income Controls N Y N Y N Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,862 1,540 1,862 1,540 1,862 1,540
R
2 0.499 0.530 0.499 0.531 0.499 0.530
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Bold
gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. All specications include country-industry, country-year, and industry-year xed
eects. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. The second specication for each measure of nancial
vulnerability also includes factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l) and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)) and
country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed
eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
Table 4: Estimation Results for the Equity Component of Inward FDI (3)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIequi
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3)
Cost of Capital Measure: Short-Term Rate
Short-Term Rate  Fin Vuln -0.0191 0.173 0.115
(0.0392) (0.347) (0.133)
Crisis  Short-Term Rate  Fin Vuln 0.00479*** -0.0321* -0.0139*
(0.00164) (0.0158) (0.00705)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y
Observations 1,540 1,540 1,540
R
2 0.530 0.530 0.530
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Bold gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All
specications include country-industry, country-year, industry-year xed eects, factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)
 Log(k/l)and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)), and country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed
eects and Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
24Table 5: Estimation Results for the Equity Component of Inward FDI (4)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIequi
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis Measure: US Retails US Loans Joint Test US Retails US Loans Joint Test
Im Rate  Fin Vuln -6.290 -1.028** -6.192 41.63 8.069*** 38.65
(5.040) (0.463) (5.164) (39.48) (2.804) (40.71)
log(US Retails)  Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.416 0.400 -2.763 -2.263
(0.334) (0.362) (2.600) (2.864)
log(US Loans)  Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.143* 0.0201 -1.183*** -0.640
(0.0700) (0.132) (0.382) (0.684)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,246 1,554 1,246 1,246 1,554 1,246
R
2 0.585 0.529 0.585 0.585 0.529 0.585
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Bold
gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All specications
include country-industry, country-year, industry-year xed eects, factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l)
and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)), and country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and
Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
Table 6: Estimation Results for the Equity Component of Inward FDI (5)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIequi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Im Rate -0.0911*** -0.0788** -0.0380 -0.0967***
(0.0324) (0.0367) (0.0307) (0.0280)
Crisis  Im Rate -0.0173 -0.0406 -0.0232 -0.0540
(0.0351) (0.0465) (0.0346) (0.0496)
Factor Endowments Controls N Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls N N Y Y
IPI Controls N N N Y
Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,665
R
2 0.137 0.145 0.163 0.192
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Bold gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All
specications include industry-year xed eects and control for the log bilateral exchange rate (EXCH) and Crisis  Log(EXCH).
The specications in columns (2)-(4) also control for Log(K/L), Crisis  Log(K/L), Log(H/L), and Crisis  Log(H/L). The
specications in columns (3)-(4) also control for Log(GDP), Crisis  Log(GDP), Log(GDPpc), and Crisis  Log(GDPpc). The
specication in column (4) further includes Log(Industrial Production Index) and Crisis  Log(Industrial Production Index).
Sample is 2006-2010.
25Table 7: Estimation Results for the Debt Component of Inward FDI (1)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIdebt
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3)
Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.0208 0.144 0.158
(0.0552) (0.256) (0.359)
Crisis  Im Rate  Fin Vuln -0.0150* -0.0162 -0.152
(0.00787) (0.108) (0.177)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y
Observations 1,554 1,554 1,554
R
2 0.301 0.301 0.301
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Bold gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. All specications include country-industry, country-year, and industry-year
xed eects. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All specications also include factor endowment
controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l) and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)) and country size and income controls (Crisis 
Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
Table 8: Estimation Results for the Debt Component of Inward FDI (2)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIdebt
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cost of Capital Measure: Im Spread = Im Rate - Short-Term Rate
Im Spread  Fin Vuln 0.0352 0.0277 0.123 0.155 -0.176 -0.167
(0.0275) (0.0285) (0.0784) (0.0958) (0.153) (0.188)
Crisis  Im Spread  Fin Vuln 0.00366** 0.00470* -0.00227 0.00131 0.0106 0.00209
(0.00147) (0.00252) (0.00899) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0137)
Factor Endowments Controls N Y N Y N Y
Initial Size and Income Controls N Y N Y N Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,862 1,540 1,862 1,540 1,862 1,540
R
2 0.262 0.301 0.262 0.301 0.262 0.302
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Bold
gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. All specications include country-industry, country-year, and industry-year xed
eects. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. The second specication for each measure of nancial
vulnerability also includes factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l) and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)) and
country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed
eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
26Table 9: Estimation Results for the Debt Component of Inward FDI (3)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIdebt
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT TANGIBILITY
(1) (2) (3)
Cost of Capital Measure: Short-Term Rate
Short-Term Rate  Fin Vuln -0.00953 -0.0526 0.181
(0.0143) (0.132) (0.169)
Crisis  Short-Term Rate  Fin Vuln -0.00427** -0.00433 -0.00821
(0.00181) (0.0106) (0.0179)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y
Observations 1,540 1,540 1,540
R
2 0.301 0.301 0.302
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Bold
gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All specications
include country-industry, country-year, industry-year xed eects, factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l)
and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)), and country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and
Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
Table 10: Estimation Results for the Debt Component of Inward FDI (4)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIdebt
Financial Vulnerability Measure: EXTERNALFINANCE TRADECREDIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis Measure: US Retails US Loans Joint Test US Retails US Loans Joint Test
Im Rate  Fin Vuln -12.24* -0.297 -12.11* 45.76 1.734 47.90
(5.966) (0.410) (5.967) (41.07) (2.009) (42.26)
log(US Retails)  Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.808* 0.786* -3.016 -3.375
(0.394) (0.387) (2.701) (2.862)
log(US Loans)  Im Rate  Fin Vuln 0.0438 0.0277 -0.223 0.459
(0.0578) (0.0494) (0.278) (0.416)
Factor Endowments Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cty-Ind, Cty-Year, Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,246 1,554 1,246 1,246 1,554 1,246
R
2 0.367 0.301 0.367 0.366 0.301 0.366
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Bold
gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All specications
include country-industry, country-year, industry-year xed eects, factor endowment controls (Crisis  Log(K/L)  Log(k/l)
and Crisis  Log(H/L)  Log(h/l)), and country size and income controls (Crisis  Log(GDP)  Industry xed eects and
Crisis  Log(GDPpc)  Industry xed eects). Sample is 2006-2010.
27Table 11: Estimation Results for the Debt Component of Inward FDI (5)
Dependent variable: Logarithmic transformation of inFDIdebt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Im Rate -0.0182 0.000690 0.00790 0.000726
(0.0293) (0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0390)
Crisis  Im Rate -0.0157 -0.0658* -0.0681** -0.0733*
(0.0309) (0.0359) (0.0323) (0.0375)
Factor Endowments Controls N Y Y Y
Initial Size and Income Controls N N Y Y
IPI Controls N N N Y
Ind-Year FEs Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,665
R
2 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.046
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Bold gures are signicant at least at the 10% level. The Crisis variable is an indicator equal to 1 in 2008 and 2009. All
specications include industry-year xed eects and control for the log bilateral exchange rate (EXCH) and Crisis  Log(EXCH).
The specications in columns (2)-(4) also control for Log(K/L), Crisis  Log(K/L), Log(H/L), and Crisis  Log(H/L). The
specications in columns (3)-(4) also control for Log(GDP), Crisis  Log(GDP), Log(GDPpc), and Crisis  Log(GDPpc). The
specication in column (4) further includes Log(Industrial Production Index) and Crisis  Log(Industrial Production Index).
Sample is 2006-2010.
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